The Tribune

By RASHAD ROLLE

Tribune News Editor

rrolle@tribunemedia.net

A MAN alleged that police officers assaulted him, threatened him and pressured him to produce $1,500 after he was accused of kidnapping and extorting a female tourist — but a Supreme Court registrar has thrown out his lawsuit after finding it was filed outside the statutory time limit.

Registrar Renaldo Toote struck out Trevor Russell’s entire claim against the Royal Bahamas Police Force and the Attorney General, ruling that the proceedings were statute-barred and therefore frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process. Mr Russell was also ordered to pay $5,000 in costs.

The ruling did not determine whether Mr Russell’s allegations against police were true. The registrar said the court was not required to resolve the competing accounts of Mr Russell and the defendants because the case turned on whether his action had been filed within the applicable limitation period.

Mr Russell’s lawsuit arose from incidents in 2018 and February 2024.

In the more recent incident, Mr Russell said he was working as a taxi driver when he accepted a booking from a man and a female tourist.

He alleged that police later contacted him and said the tourist’s mother had complained that he had kidnapped her daughter and was extorting her for money.

Mr Russell acknowledged receiving $1,500 from the woman through Venmo, but said the money was payment for taking the tourist on an island tour.

He alleged that he subsequently went to a police station, was questioned and arrested before being taken to the Central Detective Unit.

Mr Russell claimed he was threatened and assaulted and was pressured to secure another $1,500 payment. He said a friend delivered the cash and he was charged the following day with minor extortion.

He said the criminal charge was later dismissed following several adjournments and claimed the $1,500 had never been returned to him.

The defendants disputed his account. According to their case, a ship’s agent had reported a hostage or extortion demand originating from a local telephone number.

Police responded to the report, and Mr Russell was cautioned and arrested in connection with the alleged extortion.

The defendants also said a formal complainant attended the police station, an identification was made and police obtained telephone-call evidence.

Mr Russell sought $1,500 in special damages as well as general, compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages. He characterised the alleged conduct as negligence and constitutional breaches.

However, the February 2024 lawsuit was not filed until August 15, 2025 — nearly 18 months after the alleged incident.

Under section 12 of the Limitation Act, proceedings arising from acts carried out in the execution or intended execution of a public duty generally must be started within 12 months.

Mr Toote found that Mr Russell’s case, as pleaded, concerned an institutional claim against the RBPF and the Attorney General over actions arising from a police investigation.

He said the events identified by Mr Russell — the kidnapping and extortion report, police communications, his attendance at the station, questioning, arrest, investigation and charge — were all connected to the same police operation.

The registrar found that Mr Russell had not identified a separate private duty owed to him independently of that policing operation.

Mr Russell had also alleged that an unidentified officer slapped and punched him and attributed a cash demand and retaliatory remarks to officers referred to as Levarity, Johnson and Demeritte.

Mr Toote described the cash-demand allegations as “serious”, but said Mr Russell had sued only the RBPF and Attorney General and had not brought a distinct claim against an individual officer for a personal abuse of office.

The registrar said an allegation that an officer acted unlawfully was not enough, by itself, to establish that the officer had stepped outside the execution or intended execution of public duties.

The ruling examined earlier Court of Appeal authority in which police officers were sued personally and it was found that a trial was necessary to determine whether they had been acting as police officers or had embarked on a personal vendetta or “complete personal frolic”.

Mr Toote said that principle did not save Mr Russell’s case because he had not sued an individual officer or pleaded a separate cause of action based on a personal abuse of office.

Mr Russell also sought to rely on constitutional arguments to escape the limitation problem.

The registrar acknowledged Court of Appeal authority that Article 28 of the Constitution contains no limitation period preventing an aggrieved person from applying to the Supreme Court for constitutional redress.

However, he found that Mr Russell’s lawsuit had not been framed as a distinct Article 28 constitutional application.

Mr Toote said attaching constitutional language to an ordinary tort claim was insufficient to change the character of the proceedings or prevent the limitation period from applying.

The court also rejected Mr Russell’s reliance on a six-year limitation period.

Mr Toote found that once section 12 applied to the institutional police claim, the longer limitation periods governing other kinds of civil claims could not be used to extend the 12-month deadline.

Mr Russell’s lawsuit also contained allegations dating back to 2018.

He alleged that after reporting that he had been the victim of an armed robbery, he was summoned to CDU but was instead arrested over suspected threats of death made against a relative and detained for three days.

Mr Russell claimed an officer later demanded $500 to have the matter dismissed and threatened to arrest him again if he did not comply.

He said the officer continued making demands after his release and that he later complained to the RBPF’s Complaints and Corruption Department.

The defendants denied those allegations and said Mr Russell was lawfully arrested for making threats on November 26, 2018, and released two days later.

Mr Toote found the 2018 claims were plainly out of time, having been brought almost seven years after the alleged events.

He said they would have been too late even if the special 12-month limitation period did not apply because they also fell outside the three-year period for personal injury claims and the six-year period applicable to certain tort claims.